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NOTES & COMMENTS
BEARING THE BURDEN OF UNPAID WAGESDIRECTORS' LIABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF WAGE
PROTECTION
RAFIKBAWN

I. INTRODUCTION
In the event of bankruptcy or insolvency, where the assets of the
bankrupt or insolvent enterprise are often not sufficient to meet its
corresponding liabilities, the interests of one group must inevitably
give way to another. This conflict of priorities is resolved by the·
scheme of distribution expounded in the federally enacted
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. 1 While this scheme recognizes and
indeed includes as an enumerated priority unpaid employee wages,
more often than not, such claims are left unrealized.
Attempts to remedy the wage-protection problem have focused
on a number of potential mechanisms. One of the most
controversial is directors' liability for unpaid wages in bankruptcy.
On February 22, 1996 a Senate Banking Committee, in considering
various issues relating to corporate governance in general, heard the
submission of Donald MacDonald, Canada's former Minister of
Finance and a director on a number of corporate boards. In his
submission, he voiced his concern over legislation which holds
directors liable for unpaid employee wages. A better response to the
problem, he argued, would be to amend the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act "to give employees who are owed back wages a

t B.Comm. (British Columbia), LLB. anticipated 1997 (Dalhousie).
I

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
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higher claim against the remaining assets of a company." 2 Other
critics of directors' liability provisions in the area of unpaid wages
have suggested that a pool of funds should be held and
administered to accommodate the interests of employees in
bankruptcy situations. This comment will attempt to assess the
merits of each of these claims, and, following a review of the
benefits and drawbacks, submit a proposal which more effectively
addresses the objectives at the root of the problem.

II. WHY IS WAGE PROTECTION NEEDED?
Before addressing current wage protection techniques, it is useful to
consider the reasons wage protection is needed in the first placefor these reasons represent the assumptions upon which the rest of
this analysis rests. Do employees deserve special treatment and
better protection than the law currently provides?
Employees do not stand on par with their employers with
respect to negotiating terms of employment. The employer, as the
provider of income, possesses a decidedly advantageous bargaining
chip. As Dickson C.J.C. noted in Reference Re Public Service
Employee Relations Act:
Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a
person's life, providing the individual with a means of
financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role
in society. A person's employment is an essential
component of his or her sense of identity, self-worth, and
emotional wellbeing. 3

Employees can, in one sense, be seen as creditors of their
employers. In most jurisdictions employees must give their
employers credit for wages earned until they become payable,
which is usually at least one pay period. This is not a matter of
choice, but rather, one of custom. One might say, then, that
employees are involuntary unsecured creditors with all their eggs in
one basket. Unlike ordinary creditors, however, employees have

2 Ontario, Senate Task Force on Corporate Governance, Transcript of Hearing
No. 30577 (22 Feb. 1996) [unpublished] [hereinafter Senate Banking Committee
Hearing].
3 [1987] l S.C.R. 313 at 368, See also Barrettev. Crabtree, [1993] l S.C.R. 1027.
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limited access to the financial records of their employers, and are
less likely to know their rights in the case of bankruptcy or
insolvency. 4

III. SCHEMES WHICH HOLD DIRECTORS LIABLE
FOR UNPAID WAGES IN BANKRUPTCY

Over the past decade, directors have been held to owe a duty
toward more than just the shareholders of a corporation. The
corporation has taken on an enhanced public purpose well beyond
its obvious private purpose of maximizing profit. In this light, both
federal and provincial legislation has been introduced to hold
directors liable for a number of business-related activities, including
unpaid employee wages.5
In federal jurisdiction, several statutes impose varying degrees
of liability upon directors for unpaid wages, and are often directed
to specific industries. The relevant pieces of legislation include the
Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, 6 Loan Companies
Act,7 Trust Companies Act, 8 Cooperative Credit Associations Act,9 and
Canada Cooperative Associations Act. 10 In a broader context, and
perhaps more importantly, the Canada Business Corporations Ad 1
holds directors liable to employees for their salaries for a period not
exceeding one year. Indeed it was section 119 of the CBCA that was
the source of MacDonald's concern in his comments before the
Senate Banking Committee. 12
The provinces have been even more aggressive in passing
legislation to hold directors personally liable for employee claims.
In fact, every province and territory, with the exception of Nova

4 Committee on Wage Protection in Matters of Bankruptcy and Insolvency,
Wage Protection in Matters of Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1981) (Commissioner: E. Landry) [hereinafter Landry Report].
5 R. F. Hartman, "Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Directors:
Enforcing Obligations or Toothless Ideals?" (1993) 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1761.
6 R.S.C. 1985 c. I-12, s. 55.
7 R.S.C. 1985 c. L-12, s. 96.
s R.S.C. 1985 c. T-20, s. 63.
9 R.S.C. 1985 c. C-41, s. 83
JO R.S.C. 1970 c. 6, s. 74.
11 R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44, c. 27, s. 119 [hereinafter CBCA).
12 Supra note 2.
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Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, has directors'
liability provisions as part of either their companies legislation or
their employment standards legislation. 13
In most jurisdictions, the applicable directors' liability
provisions have similar characteristics. The directors will be held
jointly and severally liable, and the liability tends to extend to only
certain categories of employees. In addition, there is usually a
stated maximum amount recoverable, and where an employee
recovers, the director is subrogated to the employee's rights as
against the company or other directors. In cases of bankruptcy,
before a director will be held liable, the employee's claim of unpaid
wages must be proved.
IV. THE OBJECTIVES OF A WAGE PROTECTION
SCHEME

Directors' liability is only one of several mechanisms used to
address the problem of unpaid wages in bankruptcy. Prior to
assessing alternative mechanisms, it would be useful to review the
aims and objectives of wage protection. The following broadly
defined goals of a workable wage protection scheme will be referred
to throughout the rest of this comment.
First, a wage protection scheme must ensure that the payment
claimed is likely to be recovered and that it can be recovered with
minimal delay. In addition, the mechanism employed must be
subjected to a cost-benefit analysis to ensure that the solution is not
more costly than the problem itself. A workable wage protection
scheme must also ensure that the burden of unpaid wages is
allocated appropriately. There are four potential bearers of this
burden: the employee, the employer, the creditors of the company,
and the tax-paying public. Where should the burden fall? The
method of wage protection chosen and the administrative
mechanism employed to carry it out will have implications for the

13 See e.g. Employment Standards Act, S.B.C. 1980, c. 10, s. 19; Business
Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, c. B-15, s. 114; Corporations Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. C-225,
s. 114; Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B-16,s. 131; Companies Act, R.S.Q
1977, c. C-38, s. 96.; Business Corporations Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. B-10, s. 112;
Companies Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. C-12, s. 76; Business Corporations Act, R.S.Y.
1986, c. 15, s. 121.

BEARING THE BURDEN OF UNPAID WAGES

243

allocation of this burden. A wage protection scheme must also
recognize the potential for adverse incentives. There is always the
danger that employers will be encouraged to ignore the issue of
unpaid wages in conducting business, in the knowledge that
employees will be compensated by such a scheme if bankruptcy
ensues. In other cases, employers have a further incentive to ensure
that major creditors are paid before any claims of employees are
given priority, since owners or directors often sign personal
guarantees with their creditors. 14 A well-designed scheme will
attempt to counter these incentives. Finally, an important
consideration with any wage protection scheme is its constitutional
soundness. Any government action, whether emanating from the
provincial or federal level, must be within the jurisdiction of the
level of government implementing it.

V. ALTERNATIVE WAGE PROTECTION
MECHANISMS

The problem of unpaid wages in bankruptcy has not gone
unnoticed in Canada. Numerous measures have been undertaken to
address the issue at both federal and provincial levels, leaving open a
broad range of choices for potential employees depending on the
jurisdiction in which the matter arises. Directors' liability provisions
were considered earlier . 1 5 This section will examine other
approaches, noting both the benefits and drawbacks of each.
The multitude of legislative and administrative remedies have
been grouped into two broadly defined categories: 1) schemes
which attempt to alter the priority of asset distribution upon
bankruptcy and insolvency; and 2) schemes creating a separate
source of funds.
1. Schemes which Attempt to Alter the Priority of Distribution

In the federal context, section 136(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act provides the basic scheme for the recognition of
priorities in the event of bankruptcy. Under this Act, unpaid wages

14 I. Christie, W.B. Cotter & G. England, Employment Law in Canada, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1993) at 894 [hereinafter Employment Law in Canada].
l5 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

244

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

are considered to be a "preferred" claim. 16 This is a highly illusory
term. Wages must give way to secured interests such as registered
mortgages, liens, debentures, and bank securities. After secured
claims, wages rank fourth, behind funeral expenses, administrative
costs of bankruptcy, and government levies. Furthermore, the
extent of any claim for unpaid wages is limited. Unpaid wage
claims are restricted to wages with respect to services performed in
the six months prior to bankruptcy, and only to a maximum of
$2000.17 An additional limitation imposed by the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act is that it applies only in cases of bankruptcy, while it
is well established that many unpaid wage claims arise in the
context of insolvencies short of bankruptcy.
There are a number of pieces of federal legislation which deal
with unpaid wage claims by attempting to alter the priority of
distribution. The Bank Act18 imposes an obligation upon banks to
make prior payment to wage claimants before realizing on their
own security where loans are made to certain classes of borrowers.
The Winding-Up Act19 contains a priority interest for the salaries or
wages of clerks and other persons employed by a company being
wound up. However, this priority is much like that described in the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act in that it ranks only after the costs,
charges, and expenses due to the winding-up of the employer
company.
In light of the serious limitations imposed by the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act, a series of attempts have been made to amend
its scheme of priorities. Bill C-60, 20 tabled in the House of
Commons in 1975, proposed to grant an absolute priority to
employees for unpaid wages over all other creditors, secured or
unsecured, to a maximum of $2000 The Senate vigorously opposed
the Bill, noting that it would seriously disrupt the commercial
lending system. 21 Another attempt to amend the priorities
enumerated in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Bill-S-11, met

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 136(1)(d).
Note that the time period has been extended from three to six months and the
maximum claim from $500 to $2000 by a 1992 amendment to the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 136(1)(d), as am. by 1992 c. 27 s. 54(1).
18 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, s. 88.
19 R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, SS. 93-95.
20 An Act Respecting Bankruptcy and Insolvency, 1st. sess., 30th Pad., 1974.
21 Landry Report, supra note 4.
16

17
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with similar dissent in 1977. 22 Despite these failed attempts,
MacDonald, in his address to the Senate Banking Committee,
insists that giving a high priority against the assets of the bankrupt
employer's assets is a feasible solution to the problem of unpaid
wages. 23
The lack of protection apparent from the priorities enumerated
in the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act has prompted various
provinces to invoke their own remedies for wage protection in
bankruptcy. The majority of these initiatives attempt to
counterbalance the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act by indirectly
altering the priority of asset distribution as defined by that Act.
Approaches include: the creation of statutory preferences, 24 deemed
trusts, 2 5 and statutory security interests. 26

22 Bill S-11, An Act Respecting Bankruptcy and Insolvency, 3rd sess., 30th. Pad.,
1977.
23 Supra note 2.
24 Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.14, s.14. While this type of
provision provides some protection to the wage claimant, it has serious limitations.
First, it clearly makes an exception for the priorities laid out in the Bankruptcy Act,
and as such, does not apply in the bankruptcy context. Second, such a provision has
been unable to withstand the claims of secured creditors. In Re Campeau
Corporation v. Provincial Bank of Canada (1975), 7 O.R. (2nd) 73 (Ont. Div. Ct.),
Houlden, J. held that the words "preferred creditors" did not include secured
creditors. See also Labour Standards Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. L-2, s.37.
25 The typical provision provides for the creation of a deemed trust holding
vacation pay or unpaid wages due to an employee, whether or not the amount has in
fact been kept separate. The amount becomes a lien or charge upon the assets of the
employer in the event of bankruptcy. See Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
E.14; Labour Standards Code, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 246, s. 36(1); Labour Act R.S.P.E.I.
1988, c. L-1, s. 72 for the protection of vacation pay; and see Employment Standards
Code, S.A. 1988, c. E-10.2, s. 113(1), Labour Standards Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-1, s.56
(I. I); Payment of Wages Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P-31, s.3( 4) for wage protection
generally.
26 A statutory security interest is a lien or charge in respect of unpaid wages which
is directly assigned, by statute, a high priority in the event of bankruptcy or
insolvency. A number of jurisdictions provide statutory liens for wages earned by
workers in certain designated industries. Potential claimants include woodspersons,
see e.g. Alberta Woodsmen's Lien Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. W-14, s.5(2); warehouse
workers, see e.g. British Columbia Warehouse Lien Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 427,
s.2(2)(b); miners, see e.g. Miners Lien Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-12, s. 2(1); and
stable keepers, see e.g. Livestock Lien Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, s.244, s.2. Unfortunately,
the relevant legislation tends to be limited to distinct industries. The statutory
security interest differs from the trust approach in that it attempts to alter the
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i. Critique of the Alteration of Priorities Approach
The first drawback to the alteration of priorities approach relates to
provincially administered schemes. Their systems attempt to protect
the employee by altering the scheme of asset distribution, albeit
indirectly, and as such conflict with the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act. Section 91 (21) of the Constitution Act, 1867 27 grants the
federal Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over "bankruptcy and
insolvency;" but section 92(13) assigns "property and civil rights" to
the provinces. The courts have rejected double-aspect arguments
and have found that the order of priorities provision (section 107)
of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act for the distribution of assets
upon bankruptcy, is in "pith and substance" related to bankruptcy
and only incidentally related to property and civil rights in the
provinces. 28 As such, any provincial attempt to alter this scheme,
whether directly or indirectly, may be considered constitutionally
invalid by the courts. As noted by Wilson J. in Deloitte, Haskins,
and Sells Limitedv. Workers' Compensation Board: "[I]t would have
the effect of permitting the provinces to determine priorities on a
bankruptcy, a matter within exclusive federal jurisdiction."2 9
If the scheme of priorities under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act were itself to be altered by the federal government according to
the recommendations of MacDonald, skepticism would remain as
to the effectiveness, or for that matter appropriateness, of such an
amendment. Where an employee's claim for unpaid wages is given
priority over the claims of other creditors, the risk and burden of
bankruptcy is thrown upon the shoulders of creditors. Should
creditors accept such a risk when extending credit? The payment of
wages should not be characterized as a risk arising in the ordinary
course of business. Rather, wages are a contractual obligation, either
express or implied, between employers and their employees. When
extending credit, creditors may foresee various risks: that supply
may exceed demand; or that prices may drop for unexpected
reasons arising from external consequences beyond the control of
the business. These risk factors are taken into consideration when
scheme of distribution set out in the Bankruptcy Act in a more direct manner.
Inevitably, it results in serious constitutional uncertainty.
27 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3.
28 Parker-Eakins Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada (1988), 3 C.B.R. 211 (Ont. C.A.).
29 [1985], 4 W.W.R. 481at489; See also Re Black Forest Restaurant Ltd. (1981),
121 D.L.R. (3d) 435 (N.S.S.C. T.D.).
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determining the amount of credit, the interest rate, and whether
credit is to be granted or not. What creditors impliedly expect in
return for supplying credit is that the business itself will be
conducted in a manner most conducive to ensuring a return on the
investment. Wages, being one, if not the largest, component of
operating expenses, are therefore a primary responsibility of the
employer. When wages are left unpaid, it should be the employer,
rather than the creditor, who should have to bear the burden:
unpaid wages are not a foreseeable risk of business.
Allocating the burden of unpaid wages upon creditors has
another negative consequence: such an approach would inevitably
disrupt the commercial lending system.3° Creditors, aware of the
additional risk borne by them in the event of bankruptcy, will be
reluctant to extend credit. MacDonald himself accepts that this is
likely to be the consequence of any attempt to alter the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act. In his submission at the hearing, he notes rather
unwittingly:
I predict to you [sic] that ... bank officers will show up
before this committee and threaten that if this measure is
finally adopted, the banks will never lend a dollar again.
When that happens, I say to you, as legislators, that you
will earn your stipends. To earn the respect and affection
of all decent citizens, rise to your feet as one person and
laugh the bankers out of the room!3 1

As bold and creative an argument as this may be, he is mistaken to
suggest that the impact of such a measure upon the banking
community can be disregarded so easily. Not only will the
consequences be borne by creditors, but by all participants in the
banking system. Where credit is extended, interest rates will reflect
the additional risk, making it more expensive for both consumers
and entrepreneurs to borrow money.
The alteration of priorities approach also fails to address the
imbalance of incentives faced by management. In realizing that
claims for unpaid wages will be treated similarly to claims of other
creditors, management is actually encouraged to ignore the

30 Ontario, Report ofthe Commission ofInquiry into Wage Protection in Insolvency
Situations (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1985) (Commissioner: D. Brown)
[hereinafter Brown Report].
3! Supra note 2 at 0990-5.
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consequences of wage claims in conducting the day to day affairs of
the business.
Despite its negative impact on creditors, the alteration of
priorities approach does provide limited protection for the unpaid
employee. However, because the employer's assets may not be
sufficient to meet its liabilities in bankruptcy, this approach may
not prove to adequately compensate the employee on a regular
basis, and thus fails the certainty of payment objective. This is
largely due to the fact that it depends upon the availability of the
insolvent employer's assets. In most cases of bankruptcy and
insolvency, available assets are rarely sufficient to cover the claims of
any of the unsecured creditors. In all likelihood, the employees will
be among the last of these unsecured creditors to collect.
Finally, the "alteration of priorities" approach fails to meet the
"speed of payment" objective. Bankruptcy proceedings are lengthy
and the employee is often left waiting for an uncertain payment at
the end of them. A 1977 European Economic Community
Commission Report noted:
[The employee] having to wait for the perhaps partial
satisfaction of his claims from the employment
relationship represents at least a temporary threat to the
livelihood of himself and his family. 32

In addition, the employee is left alone to take the initiative of
staking out his or her claim. Too often employees do not recognize
that a right exists or, where there is recognition, abandonment of
the claim because the cost of seeking a remedy is prohibitive.33
2. Schemes Creating a Separate Source of Funds: The WageFund

The alternative to creating a separate wage-fund, from which
unpaid employees can collect in the case of bankruptcy, provides a
more complete form of security for the employee. Manitoba,3 4

32

1977 EEC Commission Report, as cited in: J. St. John, Ontario Ministry of
Labour, Wage Protection in Other Jurisdictions (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1984) at
3 [hereinafter EEC Report].
33 Brown Report, supra note 30.
34 PaymentofWagesAct, R.S.M. 1987, c. P-31s.19.
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0 ntario, 35 and New Brunswick36 have each created wage funds,
though the attributes of each vary. There is, however, no federally
regulated wage fund in Canada.
The provincial funds, despite their differences, share four
significant features.37 First, to be eligible, an employee must
establish his or her claim for unpaid wages. 38 Second, the employee
(or in some jurisdictions, a public agency acting on the employee's
behalf) must show that all reasonable attempts to recover the
amount owing from the employer have met with failure.39 Third,
the amount of any claim is subject to a statutory limits.4° Fourth,
the administrative agency regulating the fund is entitled to be
subrogated to the employee with regard to the claim.4 1

Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E-14 at ss. 58.1-58.18
Employment Standards Act, S.N.B. 1982, c. E-7.2, s. 77.
37 Employment Law in Canada, supra note 14 at 837.
38All three jurisdictions require an employee to establish his or her claim by
obtaining an order under the appropriate legislation and that the order not be
under appeal or review; see Manitoba, Man. Reg. 106/87 R, s.2; New Brunswick,
Employment Standards Act, S.N.B. 1982, c. E-7.2, s. 77(l)(e); Ontario, Employment
Standards Act, R.S.0. 1990, c. E-14, s. 58.4(1).
39 See Manitoba, Man. Reg. 106/87 R, s.2(a)(b); New Brunswick, Employment
Standards Act, S.N.B. 1982, c. E-7.2, s. 77(l)(d); Ontario, Employment Standards
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E-14, s. 58.5(1)(2).
40 In Manitoba, these limits are expressed in terms of a maximum dollar amount
of $1,200 per year as well as by excluding termination wage entitlements from
coverage, see Man. Reg. 106/87 R, s.3.
In Ontario, entitlements correspond to what is available under the Act,
supplemented by "such additional payments as may be prescribed by regulation, "
see Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E-14, s. 50.1(2).
In New Brunswick, the entitlement to compensation from the fund covers wages,
vacation pay, and termination pay, but does not cover "any other benefit owing to an
employee" and "compensation for economic loss," see Employment Standards Act,
S.N.B. 1982, c. E-7.2, ss. 77(l)(a-c) [am. S.N.B. 1988, c.59, s. 21], s. 65 (l)(c)(i-v) [as
am. by S.N.B. 1988, c. 59, s.20].
41 See Manitoba, Man. Reg 106/87 R s.4; New Brunswick, Employment
Standards Act, S.N.B. 1982, c. E-7.2s. 77(2); Ontario, Employment Standards Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. E-14, s.40(o). See also Re fames, Director ofEmployment Standards
Division et al. v. Trustee, [1985] 4 W.W.R. 526 (Man. Q.B.) in which subrogation
entitled the director to claim status pursuant to then s. l 07(l)(j) of the Bankruptcy
Act.
35
36
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i. Critique of the Wage-Fund Approach
The wage-fund approach, unlike the alteration of priont1es
approach, avoids reliance on an employer's assets upon bankruptcy.
For that reason, the expected payout from a wage fund is generally
more certain than the expected payout from the priority of
distribution approach. However, if not financed properly, it is quite
possible that a wage fund, as the sole source of compensation for
unpaid wage claims, may be insufficient to meet every claim. The
wage-fund approach is not dependent upon bankruptcy
proceedings and therefore provides a more timely payout to
employees. The experience of the United Kingdom, which
established a "redundancy fund" to protect employee wages,
suggests that a well-administered fund may ensure payment in a
matter of days. 42 After payout, the administrative agency regulating
the fund is subrogated to the rights of the employee for the value of
the claim and may seek payment once bankruptcy proceedings have
commenced.
The wage-fund may, however, be fraught with flaws if not
structured or financed properly. Its greatest potential downfall is
with regard to the choice of financing. Who should contribute to
the fund? This question depends largely upon whether the problem
of unpaid employee wages is characterized as a social issue of public
concern or a private matter between the employee and employer.
As noted earlier, unpaid wages should not be characterized as a
risk in the ordinary course of business from the point of view of a
creditor lending money. It follows that creditors should not be
required, whether directly or indirectly, to contribute to such a
fund. Regardless, a provincial wage-fund relying to any extent on
the assets of the employer upon bankruptcy would have the effect
of bumping creditors in the priority of distribution. Unless it is
initiated by the federal government along with an amendment to
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, such a wage-fund would have
constitutional obstacles to overcome.
Should the risk be borne by the taxpayer? An employee wagefund financed by the Consolidated Revenue Fund imposes the
burden of unpaid wages, and bankruptcy, upon the public. Such an
approach would be tantamount to socializing the costs of private

42 EEC

Report, supra note 32 at 7.
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economic failure. The Landry Report expressed similar disdain in
allocating the burden on taxpayers:
[W] age protection is not on the same level of social
objectives as those measures that are already covered by
the general tax paying system . . . [T]here does not
appear to be any social justification to impose the total
burden of protecting wage claims directly on the
taxpayer. A source of financing closer to the causes of the
problem of unpaid wages must be identified.43

Does the Committee imply that both the employee and employer
should contribute to the wage-fund? One might look to the
example of employment insurance and argue that the problem of
unpaid wages, much like unemployment, should be rectified by
imposing periodic levies on both employees and employers to
finance the wage-fund. This approach characterizes the issue of
unpaid wages as it should be: a problem existing in the private
sphere of business, but at the same time, deserving of public
regulatory attention.
Yet the contribution of employees to the fund also raises some
concern. Requiring employees to contribute would be to insist on a
sort of private insurance to protect against the breach of an express
or implied term of an employment contract (that is, the obligation
to pay). Given the already inferior position of employees vis-d-vis
their employers, such a requirement is rather onerous. As the
Landry Report notes:
[T]here is a distinction between a program to insure
income maintenance during a period of unemployment,
in respect of which employees are required to contribute,
and a program intended to provide payment of amounts
legally owed to employees for work performed.
Therefore, the Committee does not endorse the
allocation of any cost of wage protection on employees. 44
A similar view is taken by European countries. Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, and a host of other European
countries, finance their respective wage-funds exclusively by

43 Supra note 4 at 41.
44 Supra note 4 at 45.
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employer contributions. 45 The
issue by stating:

EEC

Report addressed the financing

These [wage] guarantees should not lead to any
additional financial burdens on the employees. The funds
for this purpose should therefore be raised only from the
employers' contributions. In this connection the
contributions are to be calculated in such a way that the
institutions will always have adequate cover in reserve. 46

We are left, then, with employers as the sole contributors to the
wage-fund. This approach would address the important issue of the
imbalance of incentives in a more favourable way. Management's
incentive to see that creditors, to whom personal guarantees may be
owed, are paid in priority is countered by the fact that the wagefund provides a separate and distinct source of funds to which
creditors have no access.
The wage-fund concept is potentially open to abuse. Germany's
experience with its Bankruptcy Indemnification Fund provides a
telling tale of the moral hazards which may ensue. Employers often
increased wages prior to the date of insolvency. Related or fictitious
persons would be added as employees on the eve of a bankruptcy.
Businesses would sustain hopeless operations by encouraging
employees to forego wages on the basis that they were protected by
a fund. Individuals would set up businesses for the sole purpose of
creating their own wage claims and then force the business into
bankruptcy. 47
In addition, the wage-fund is not always a cost-efficient
alternative. The total value of claims for unpaid wages would be
much smaller than claims for unemployment benefits, for example.
The cost of administering such a fund would be a larger percentage
of the value of the fund itself. This raises the obvious question: is it
financially feasible? This is particularly the case for a provincially
administered fund. 48

EEC Report, supra note 32 at 26.
Ibid at 26.
47 Brown Report, supra note 30. at 17.
48 The Brown Report, ibid., estimates the administrative costs of a provincial
wage fund by considering the expenses of other administrative agencies. It notes that
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board administered approximately
$3,000,000 in awards in 1983 and its administration costs were approximately
45

46
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VI. DO DIRECTORS' LIABILITY PROVISIONS
MORE EFFECTIVELY MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF
WAGE PROTECTION?

It is apparent that both priority-alteration schemes and wage-funds
are to some extent effective in meeting the objectives set out earlier,
although each has its drawbacks. Directors' liability provisions
similarly fall into this "middle-ground" level of effectiveness. To
some extent, the ability of directors' liability provisions to meet the
objectives of wage protection depends on one's assumptions about
the role of directors.
In an ideal case, directors' liability for unpaid wage claims
allows the burden of bankruptcy to be directed back to its root
cause. This perspective assumes that directors are the directing
minds of a company, aware of all business decisions, including any
decision to withhold the payment of wages or file for bankruptcy.
However, this assumption is not always accurate; it may be true in a
closely-held corporation, but it is not always the case in widely-held
corporate entities. As a recent Toronto Stock Exchange Committee
on Corporate Governance in Canada (the Dey Report) 49 suggests
the key role of a director is to supervise and oversee the
management of the corporation. A director cannot, and should not,
be expected to be aware of the intricacies of daily managerial tasks.
As Michael Geist notes, "It is beyond the board's responsibility ...
to engage in the day-to-day management of a corporation, a
responsibility that must be delegated to senior management
personnel. "50
This view of a director's obligation is well accepted in common
law as well. In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., Romer J. held
twenty percent of that figure. Based on 1985 statistics, the Unemployment
Insurance Commission [now the Employment Insurance Commission] where eight
percent of the amounts administered and the Workers' Compensation Board's costs
of administration were approximately fourteen percent of their total revenues. The
report estimated that the establishment of a provincial fund would likely require
thirty new personnel and an overall net cost of ten percent of the monies
administered by it (note that these figures represent estimates for a provincial as
opposed to a federal fund and are based on statistics available in 1985).
49 Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada,
"Final Report: Where Were the Directors?" (Toronto: Toronto Stock Exchange,
1994) (Chair: P. Dey) [hereinafter Dey Report].
50 M. Geist, "The Dey Report: The Wave of the Future" (Faculty of Law,
Dalhousie University, 1995) [unpublished] at 6.
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that a director was not expected to give "continuous attention" to
the daily affairs of a company. 51 The same case held that in the
absence of grounds for suspicion, a director is justified in delegating
management related duties to officials, and trusting such officials
to perform these tasks efficiently and honestly. 52 The payment of
wages is a largely administrative task that would fall into this
category.
There may, however, be some merit in the claim that, while it is
not a director's duty to pay wages per se, directors have the
responsibility of monitoring a company's internal controls,
including its payroll.5 3 The Dey Report recommended that boards
appoint an audit committee to monitor a company's finances.5 4
Given the supervisory function of directors over finances and
internal controls, and their access to financial information, such as
the company's accounts and payroll, it would seem appropriate that
where a company faces imminent bankruptcy, a director would owe
a duty to all parties, including employees, who would be adversely
affected by the company's insolvency.55
While directors may not be well informed of payroll
mechanisms, especially in larger companies, a liability for unpaid
wages may nonetheless generate important incentive effects.
[The] underlying purpose for imposing personal liability
on a director is to encourage directors to ensure that
salaries are determined in advance by the company and
paid regularly to the employees.56

The most valid reason for imposing liability on directors for
unpaid wage claims is that it clearly addresses the balance of
incentives problem. A director's potential personal liability to
51 [1925] Ch 407 at 429.

52

Ibid at 429.
The Dey Report, supra note 49, suggests that the board of a company assumes
five specific duties, of which one is the maintenance of the integrity of the
corporation's internal controls and management information systems.
54 Supra note 49.
55 It has been suggested, however, that in cases of bankruptcy and insolvency a
director's duty is primarily toward the creditors of the company. Such an approach
may in fact work counter to the interests of employee, see Employment Law in
Canada, supra note 14 at 852, see also M. Geist, Lecture, (Dalhousie University,
January 1996).
56 Schwartzv. Scott(l985), 32 D.L.R. 1 at 3 (Que. C.A.).
53
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employees counters the personal guarantee provided to creditors,
making the liabilities to each more equal in the eyes of directors.
Although, the incentive effect is far more predominant in closelyheld corporations.
Clearly the strongest argument against directors' liability is that
it adds one more catch to the director's job description. There is
the serious possibility that competent directors will be discouraged
from accepting board positions.57 This chilling effect of section 119
of the CBCA was the focus of MacDonald's arguments before the
Senate Banking Committee:
The effect of provisions like section 119 is that, in
circumstances where a corporation is in difficulties, and
at the very moment in time when it is in greatest need of
wise counsel and direction from a board of directors, for
personal reasons members of the board cannot afford the
risk of continuing in office.5 8

The impact of such a provision is particularly detrimental in
labour intensive industries, where both the potential for claims as
well as the value of claims, are likely to be higher than average.59 It
may be said that holding directors liable for unpaid wages is too
harsh an imposition, especially in cases where directors may not
have been responsible for the non-payment decision or, for that
matter, the bankruptcy itself.
It is also unlikely that full payment of wages can be effectively
realized under a director's liability provision standing alone, even if
the provision demands joint and several liability. In many cases of
bankruptcy, the directors themselves end up bankrupt or are
responsible for personal guarantees granted to commercial
creditors, which reduces their ability to pay employees. However,
directors' insurance is common among most corporations. In

57 Employment Law in Canada, supra note 14 at 851. Geist, supra note 50 at 8,
notes: "increased personal liability of directors compounds the difficulty of
recruiting qualified individuals to serve as directors."
5B Senate Banking Committee Hearing, supra note 2, at 0990-3.
59 In response to MacDonald's comments before the Senate Banking Committee,
supra note 2, Senator Meighen notes that the Committee had just the day prior
heard evidence from someone in a labour intensive industry who indicated that
wages over six months would amount to approximately $400 million without
benefits and holiday pay.
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addition, the CBCA and some provincial corporations statutes, allow
a company to indemnify a director for any charges laid against him
or her. 60 Of course, where the company itself is bankrupt, the
impact of such a provision is diminished.
Imposing director liability may not be the most cost-effective
approach to the unpaid wages problem. It entails civil action and
carries with it the usual pitfalls of the litigious forum. Given
relatively small claims and minimal chances of recovery, the costs of
pursuing a director's liability claim for unpaid wages are too often
prohibitive for an employee. Furthermore, the fact that the
employee's claim for unpaid wages must be proved before a
director will be held liable usually means waiting until lengthy
bankruptcy proceedings are complete before any claim will be
payable. 61

VII.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Two points are clear from the analysis. First, the mechanisms
currently employed to protect wages are diverse and scattered
among legislative enactments set out by both levels of government.
Second, each mechanism, standing alone, appears to fall short of
fully meeting the objectives of a valid and effective wage protection
program.
In addressing the concerns of employees, the author
recommends the use of a combined approach, one which fully
brings to light the potential benefits of the various mechanisms but
which makes adjustments to weed out their inherent flaws. The

60 The CBCA, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44, c. 27, s.124(1) allows for indemnification of all
charges, costs, and expenses reasonably incurred by a director in respect of any civil,
criminal or administrative action or proceeding to which she or he is made a party
by reason of being or having been a director of the corporation.
61 Under the common law, a plaintiff must not only show that a director
breached his or her duty, but also that it was the directors' negligence that caused
the loss in question; see Barnesv. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y., 1924) [hereinafter
Barnes]. However, section 119 of the CBCA has been held to impose absolute
liability upon the director whereby unpaid wages are payable despite evidence of no
wrong doing on behalf of the director, see Senate Banking Committee Hearing,
supra note 2. Despite this absolute liability, proof of the claim itself would likely be
required, and this would entail awaiting the close of bankruptcy proceedings.
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proposal suggested attempts to address each of the objectives of a
workable wage protection scheme. 62
A detailed description of the internal workings of this proposal
is not intended here. At the risk of overlooking technicalities, the
scope of this comment permits only a broader exploration of the
principal policy issues involved. To facilitate the analysis,
characteristics of the proposed approach are highlighted first. A
closer look at its benefits, particularly its ability to meet the stated
objectives, follows.
1. Characteristics of the Proposed Approach

The proposed approach should be initiated by the Canadian federal
government. It would combine a wage protection fund with a
directors' liability provision. The fund itself would be financed
solely by employers by way of a contribution based on payroll. The
fund would be regulated by the federal government, and would
operate under the administrative infrastructure of the employment
msurance program.
The fund would make timely payments to employees, up to a
maximum or threshold amount, and such payments would be
made as soon as possible after the appointment of a receiver or
liquidator in bankruptcy. For any proved value above the threshold
amount payable by the fund, officials would be subrogated to the
rights of the employee to collect the outstanding value from the
directors of the company. Various safeguards would be included in
the scheme to protect directors from the moral hazard of
overzealous claims.
A threshold or maximum value must be defined as the point at
which the fund will no longer make the payout and instead, the
subrogated rights of officials will kick in to hold the directors
liable. 63 This cap can be either monetary or a limit in terms of a
period of employment. A monetary limit may be inappropriate in

62

See Part IV.
At the Senate Banking Committee Hearing, supra note 2 at 0990-9, Senator
Meighen questioned MacDonald: "[W]ould you not think it necessary to consider
a cap on the liability of directors to remove what has been termed as liability chill
and the discouragement of good people from serving on boards?" MacDonald
responded: "I have not really thought about a cap, but I appreciate the suggestion. I
will think about it when I leave."
63
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the face of inflation and also because it may not take account of
differences in earning levels between employees. As such, a cap by
way of time period is more suitable. The time period chosen must
somehow coincide with the time period during which an employee
can be expected to become aware that his or her wages are not
being paid. When the cap, as defined, does not adequately cover
the total of the unpaid wage claim in question, officials should give
effect to the directors' liability provision for the remaining value of
the claim. If an amount is recovered from the directors, it should be
handed over to the employee.

2. Benefits of the Proposed Approach
i. Federally Enacted

Ideally, any initiatives regarding wage protection should be taken
by the federal government, which has been given the express
authority to legislate with regard to bankruptcy and insolvency. But
the benefits of federal enactment are rooted deeper than a mere
recognition of responsibility.
First and foremost, federal action would remove any doubts as
to the constitutional validity of a wage protection measure.
Conflicting provincial schemes would be replaced with the federal
mechanism, resulting in a more readily accessible, nationally
consistent, and certain remedy.
Second, if enacted by the federal government, the existing
administrative infrastructure of the Employment Insurance
Commission could be used to administer the wage protection
program. While this would require the concurrence of the
provinces, the potential cost savings of this approach clearly makes
it a favourable alternative.
ii. Certainty of Payment

An approach which combines a wage-fund with a directors' liability
provision ensures a more likely payout to the employee. There is no
dependence on the company's assets. Further, any amount claimed
above the fund's cap would be subject to recovery from the
directors.
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iii. Speed of Payment
The wage-fund's payout procedure would be designed to make
timely payments by ensuring that any proven claim for unpaid
wages is disbursed to the employee from the fund, up to the value
as defined by the cap, immediately upon the appointment of a
receiver or liquidator to the bankruptcy. This is the approach taken
by the administrators of the United Kingdom's Redundancy Fund,
and has resulted in expedient disbursements. 64 In Sweden, the
agency administering the Wage Guarantee Fund is mandated to
act as quickly as possible, even when there is the possibility of
improper payment. This is seen as an "acceptable cost of expediting
payments of small sums if the employee's claim seems likely." 6 5
The proposed approach eliminates the need for an employee to
prove that a director's negligence caused the lost wages to accrue, at
least up to the cap of the wage-fund. After the cap amount has been
reached, the onus would shift to the director to prove due diligence
or lack of responsibility for the non-payment decision. 66

iv. Addressing the Balance of Incentives
The proposed scheme puts employees on par with commercial
creditors in the eyes of the board of directors: there is the potential
to be held directly liable for any unpaid wages in the event of
bankruptcy. The potential abuses of a wage-fund, standing alone,
are also reduced. Since director's will be held liable for wages above
the fund's cap, the incentive to abuse the fund is lessened. This
would eliminate director abuse such as: attempting to remain afloat
by foregoing wages on the basis that such wages will be covered by
a fund; inflating wages; or adding fictitious employees to the
payroll on the eve of bankruptcy. Furthermore, an incentive is
created for directors to take a more active role in monitoring
finances and internal procedures, including the payroll of a
corporation.

EEC Report, supra note 32 at 22.
Ibid at 22.
66 See infra note 68 and accompanying text.

64
65
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v. Safegu,ards to Limit Directors' Liability
The fact that yet another dimension to directors' liability is being
mandated by this proposal should not be ignored. From the
directors' standpoint, a position on the board is not as attractive as
it used to be, and this may deter competent persons from accepting
such positions. For this reason, the proposed scheme would contain
various safeguards to limit the potentially burdensome impact on
directors. Some of these safeguards are inherent in the proposal
without being explicitly stated. For example, directors would only
be liable for claims above the wage-fund cap. The cap itself is
designed to be adequate in covering expected wage losses, leaving
only occasional circumstances and limited amounts for which
directors will potentially be liable. In addition, as previously
mentioned, directors are usually covered by insurance to
compensate them for personal liability.
More explicitly, various limitations would be contained in the
proposed scheme to restrict the reach of the directors' liability
provision. For example, the provision would only be accessible to
agency officials and not to employees bringing any action
independently. It would be accessed within a strictly regulated
administrative framework. As such, discretion may be utilized to
decline imposing liability where a director can bring forth evidence
suggesting that he or she had opposed, unsuccessfully, the
employer's decision to withhold pay or file bankruptcy. This is in
line with proposals found in the Dey Report, which suggests a due
diligence defence is appropriate in liability cases involving unpaid
wages. 67 Such an approach also places the onus on the director to
prove a lack of negligence, as opposed to the onus on the employee
to prove causation under the common law. 68 Further discretion may
be utilized to limit the claims upon a director where the amount is
too high, as might exist in labour intensive industries or where the
potential for contribution from other directors is slim. 6 9

6 7 Supra note 44. See also: Senate Banking Committee Hearing, supra note 2.
MacDonald also advocates a due diligence defence in his submission before the
Senate Banking Committee. However, he prefers the approach of abolishing the
directors' liability provision in section 119 of the CECA altogether.
68 Barnes, supra note 61.
69 Employment Law in Canada, supra note 14 at 852.
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vi. Burden Appropriately Allocated
The combined approach places the burden of unpaid wages in
bankruptcy where it should fall in two respects. First, the wagefund is financed solely by employer contributions via payroll
deductions. Second, by imposing a potential liability on directors,
the burden of unpaid wages and of bankruptcy is re-routed to its
primary cause. Of course, the latter assumption remains more
accurate in the case of closely-held corporations. In any case, the
creditors and the tax paying public remain unaffected.

vii. Cost-Effectiveness
It was suggested earlier that one of the drawbacks of a wage-fund
was that the cost of its administrative structure would be too large
in relation to the total value of the fund to mal<:e it cost-effective. A
directors' liability provision, standing alone, was also seen as costprohibitive from an individual employee's point of view. Because
the proposed approach would be implemented by the federal
government, it could be administered within the existing
machinery of the Employment Insurance Commission, thereby
preventing duplication of resource expenditures that would occur
with a separately administered wage-fund. In addition, a national
scheme, as opposed to a provincial one, would be able to take
advantage of economies of scale. Because the value of a federal fund
would be larger, administrative expenses would encompass a lower
percentage of the total value administered by the fund. Also, the
cost of obtaining a remedy would be reduced for the employee
since the administrative mechanism, as opposed to litigation, would
be utilized to seek compensation.

3. Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Approach
One may argue the suggested proposal merely imposes an
additional tax upon the employer, and that, in the larger scheme of
things, the employees, the public, and even the creditors will share
in that burden. Employers, faced with an additional operating cost,
will pass this cost on in the form of lower employee wages, higher
consumer prices, and higher risk premium to creditors.
Unfortunately, this trickle down effect might be an unavoidable
and indirect result of any proposed scheme. It cannot, however, be
used to justify directly placing the burden of unpaid wages and
bankruptcy upon those who are not directly responsible for it.
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Another argument recognizes a potentially adverse effect of the
proposal; smaller businesses could be subsidizing larger businesses in
contributing to the employer-financed wage-fund. With careful
planning, this need not be the case. Employer contributions to the
wage-fund, which would form a percentage of the total payroll,
could be adjusted in a manner more representative of the potential
liability of the company over time. Indeed, various adjustments to
the scheme would necessarily emanate from regular reviews of the
functioning of the program.

VUI. CONCLUSION
Earlier in this comment, a critical question was posed: do
employees deserve special treatment and better protection? The
underlying emphasis of this paper, and indeed a common thread
running throughout it is that the answer is in the affirmative. An
equally important question, however, is how can this special
treatment and better protection be provided? Admittedly,
directors' liability is a controversial issue. When imposed without
safeguards, it has the potential to cause serious detriment not only
to directors serving on boards, but also to the supply of future
directors. In exploring the various mechanisms employed by both
levels of government to protect employee wage claims in
bankruptcy, it is clear that there is no clear winner. The key aim of
this comment is to illustrate this very fact. However, when joined,
these approaches may serve to provide a remedy in which the
combined whole is better than the sum of the individual parts. In
the author's opinion, directors' liability provisions, when combined
with a wage-fund scheme offers one such beneficial compromise.
Admittedly, only a skeletal framework is provided here; much
more will need to be decided upon before such a proposal could be
accepted. However, the author submits that a first step desperately
needs to be taken. In the past twenty years, the federal government
has repeatedly acknowledged the need for such action, but it has
done nothing. The pressing need for some form of wage protection
is only accelerating, and the inadequate, not to mention conflicting,
nature of existing legislation begs for a national response.

